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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although there has long been a debate in the United States as 
to whether we are an overly litigious society1, it is fair to say that 
the world largely views the United States as the most litigious 
nation on earth. Not open to debate is the fact that there is a great 
deal of litigation in the United States every year, and that the 
number of United States civil litigations (5,806 cases filed per year 
per 100,000 people) is much higher than in other countries 
(compared, for example, to other major legal systems such as the 
U.K. [3,681 cases per 100,000 people], Australia [1,542 cases filed 
per 100,000 people] and Canada [1,450 cases filed per 100,000 
people]).2 
Concomitantly, it is not surprising that the United States has 
more lawyers than any other country. Recent estimates show there 
are more than 1.1 million lawyers in the United States, or one 
lawyer per 270 residents.3 Direct comparisons to other countries is 
difficult for a variety of reasons, including the fact that providers of legal 
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services can include non-lawyers such as notaries who provide legal 
services in many countries around the world.  Nevertheless, by any 
reasonable measure it is clear that both the amount of litigation and the 
number of lawyers in the United States are robust.4   
Similarly not surprising is that all of this litigation with all of 
these lawyers come at substantial cost to litigants in the United 
States.  Costs of tort litigation alone in the United States have risen 
from $1.8 billion in 1950 when it represented 0.62 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to $148.1 billion in 2009 or 1.74 
percent of GDP.5  Tort costs as a percentage of GDP are 
significantly higher in the United States than in any other country 
and have increased steadily from $1.8 billion (0.62% of GDP) in 
1950 to $260.1 billion by 2004, (representing 2.22% of GDP for 
that year).6 Unquestionably such legal costs have been increasing 
significantly in the United States. The average annual increase in 
tort costs from 1950-2004 is 9.6% while the average annual 
increase in GDP for the same time period is 7.1%.7  As a ratio to 
economic output, United States tort costs exceed those of other 
industrialized countries by a sizable margin; with the exception of 
Italy, which had a tort cost as a percentage of GDP of 1.7% 
(compared to 2.2% for the United States), other countries have 
recent tort costs relative to economic output comparable to those in 
the United States in the 1960s and 1970s.8 Per capita tort costs in 
the United States adjusted for inflation have risen by a factor of 
nearly 10 from 1950 to 2004.9  
There arguably exist many factors that combine to cause the 
American explosion of litigation and its attendant costs.  A major 
contributing factor encouraging litigiousness and its resultant costs 
in the United States is the continued use of the “American Rule” as 
the general mechanism for assigning the payment of lawyers’ fees. 
This rule, generally requiring each party to a litigation to bear that 
party’s respective attorney’s costs, affords plaintiffs little risk in 
pursuing law suits under the simple calculus that for limited and 
often estimatable legal fees plaintiffs can instigate and pursue 
lawsuits which may allow a significant payoff if they win, whereas 
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defendants also must pay legal fees to minimize the risk of losing, 
whether they are or are not legally in the wrong. 
This approach is in contrast to the so-called “English Rule” 
that requires the losing party in a civil law suit to reimburse the 
winning party’s legal costs10 (this is really the “World Rule” 
inasmuch as the rest of the world generally follows this rule, as 
well as in that the “American Rule” is followed only in the United 
States11; which also begs the question: Is the rest of the entire 
world wrong?), Such a “loser pays” rule as otherwise used world 
wide appears to have the advantage of eliminating the plaintiffs’ 
incentive for bring suits that may in fact be dubious.  
This article examines the history and contemporary 
application of the American Rule, with an eye toward assessing 
whether American justice might better and more cost effectively  
be served by a change to a “Loser Pays” system like that presently 
used in England, and around the globe.  
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON ATTORNEY-FEE 
SHIFTING 
 
The “United States Rule” that each party to litigation should, 
in the absence of a statute to the contrary, bear the cost of its own 
legal costs is well ingrained in our system. The losing party in civil 
litigation in federal courts is generally assessed court costs in both 
trial and appellate cases.12 The state rules generally parallel the 
federal rule with few exceptions.13  
 
But this was not always the case in the United States. 
Originally, colonial America adopted the English Rule and 
allowed the prevailing party to collect attorney’s fees from the 
losing party.14 In migrating to and then maintaining the American 
Rule the most often cited rationale was enhancing access to 
justice—a concern that a “loser pays” system may discourage 
aggrieved parties from pursuing legal remedies in the courts out of 
fear of having to pay not only their own attorney’s fees, but also 
those of the defendant if they lose.15 Of note, however, is that 
contrary to the oft stated rationale, the English Rule (again, more 
2014 / Leading the World / 4 
 
accurately the “World Rule”) was not adopted in the United States 
after its independence from England because of any concern about 
access to justice, but rather out of a desire by lawyers to not be 
limited to the statutory compensation provided for under the old 
statutes.16 The English Rule was abandoned along with the low 
statutory limits on lawyer’s fees, effectively allowing lawyers to 
charge higher fees but removing the requirement that the loser pay 
both his/her attorney’s fees along with those of the prevailing party 
in civil suits.17  
 
The genesis of the American Rule as a means of maximizing 
the profitability of a law practice is a useful fact to keep in mind 
when evaluating the relative merits of the American Rule versus 
the World Rule.   
 
III. WHO BENEFITS FROM THE AMERICAN RULE? 
In the debate over the relative merits of the American Rule 
over the English/World Rule, access to justice is a primary 
argument advanced for maintaining the status quo. If “loser pays” 
is adopted, the argument goes, plaintiffs, in particular those of 
limited means, will be dissuaded from asserting their rights in 
court for fear of having to pay the potentially high attorneys’ fees 
of the prevailing party.18 But commentators have also argued that 
this American no-indemnity rule “is a practice of the bar that 
worked for it and not a solution consciously chosen to meet ideals 
of access to justice. The latter . . . is an after the fact 
rationalization.”19 With each party having to bear the cost of their 
attorney’s fees, there is little risk for plaintiffs to assert weak 
claims in the hope of extracting a settlement from defendants who 
know that defending such suits can be more costly than settling 
even when they have a high probability of success at trial.20 The 
American rule can also makes many, and some argue most, legal 
victories Pyrrhic ones because unreimbursed legal fees can be 
greater than the actual judgment a winning plaintiff obtains at 
trial.21  
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The results are even worse for defendants who when faced 
with determined plaintiffs with weak or inflated claims have the 
unsavory choice to either settle such claims or litigate them in 
court where they will eventually prevail but be left to pay their 
own lawyers’ fees in addition to the inconvenience and frustration 
of having to litigate such claims. A notorious case in point is that 
of a Washington D.C. plaintiff suing a dry cleaner for $67 million 
for the loss of a pair of pants.22 The plaintiff, a Washington D.C. 
administrative law judge, eventually reduced his suit to $54 
million for pants lost by the dry cleaners; the ensuing litigation 
which dragged on for more than two years and cost the defendants 
in excess of $100,000 eventually led to their closing down the 
business, even though fundraisers and local donations helped 
defray most of the defendant’s litigation costs.23  
Where is the justice for this defendant under the American 
Rule? This is a result that could only happen in the United States 
and the fact that it is rare must be of little consolation to the Chung 
family who have no recourse in law after prevailing in court in a 
case that clearly illustrates the potential for abuse made possible by 
the American custom that each litigant should be responsible for 
his/her own legal fees.24  Although an extreme example, the design 
of the American system allows for many lesser unpublicized but 
still significant obstacles to justice. 
IV. CURRENT FEE SHIFTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Under our current system, court costs and attorney’s fees are 
treated differently. The losing party pays all court costs with only 
rare exceptions in federal courts for both trials and appeals.25 Costs 
include modest witness fees, but do not generally include 
compensation of expert witnesses.26 And attorney’s fees are 
awarded only under exceptional circumstances such as when a 
statute allows for reimbursement of legal fees or when a court 
finds that a lawsuit was brought in bad faith. Since the 1970’s, the 
number of federal statutes that allow for attorney’s fee awards 
have increased dramatically.27 Since the first federal fee-shifting 
statute in 1870 that required awarding attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing plaintiffs at trial in cases involving federal civil rights 
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acts, the practice has become more common at the federal and state 
levels.28 The number of statutes allowing the award of attorney’s 
fees to prevailing plaintiffs increased from 30 in 1975 to 
approximately 150 in 1983.29  
A. Federal Examples of Loser Pays Rules 
1. Federal Offer of Judgment Rules: 
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains an 
offer of judgment provision that was intended to clear the 
congested federal dockets by promoting settlement and avoiding 
protracted litigation.30 The drafters intended to allow defendants 
who made an offer of judgment to a plaintiff to recover their post-
offer costs when the plaintiff rejected the offer, proceeded to trial, 
and prevailed, but received a judgment less favorable than the 
offer.31 This rule provided the defendant with an incentive to make 
a serious offer in order to invoke the effects of the rule and 
plaintiffs were given an incentive to seriously consider accepting 
the offer or risk penalties for choosing unwisely to continue 
litigation after a settlement offer was made.32 However, only the 
Eleventh and Fourth Circuits have interpreted Rule 68 to allow for 
the reimbursement of both court costs and attorney’s fees incurred 
by the prevailing party after a settlement offer is rejected if the 
subsequent award is less than the settlement offer.33  
 
2. The Equal Access to Justice Act: 
 
Originally passed by Congress in 198034, the Equal Access to 
Justice Act is intended to permit certain parties, particularly 
individuals and small businesses,35 to challenge unreasonable 
federal government actions, by allowing federal courts to award 
attorney’s “fees and [other] expenses36 to certain prevailing parties 
in certain actions involving the federal government37.  
 
The Act’s two main provisions generally allow for recovery 
of reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs in administrative 
proceedings38 and civil lawsuits39, respectively.  An award will be 
made unless the adjudicating officer or court finds that the position 
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of the United States was substantially justified, or that special 
circumstances exist that would make such an award unjust40. 
 
While the Act is “one sided” in that it permits only the non-
government litigant the possibility of collecting by enforcing 
“loser pays” against the government, like the numerous  other 
federal fee shifting rules, the Equal Access to Justice Act provides 
at least some relief similar to that provided under the English Rule 
 
B. States with Loser Pays Rules 
 
Some states provide fee shifting or loser pays rules under 
certain circumstances by statute. Although the circumstances under 
which fee-shifting to the losing party can occur vary and, with the 
exception of Alaska are quite modest, a brief overview of some of 
these “loser pays” provisions may be instructive. 
 
1. Alaska: 
 
The State of Alaska allows courts to compensate prevailing 
parties for attorneys’ fees and authorizes the Alaska Supreme 
Court to determine by rule or order the costs that may be awarded 
in civil actions to prevailing parties.41 Courts are granted the 
discretion to abate in whole or in part the awarding of attorneys’ 
fees in cases involving the United States Constitution or the 
Constitution of the State of Alaska.42 Prevailing parties in civil 
actions are generally entitled to receive an award for attorneys’ 
fees to parties awarded money judgments under the following 
schedule:43 
 
 Judgment and, if  
awarded, Prejudgment  Contested  Contested   Non- 
 Interest  with Trial  without Trial  Contested  
 First $ 25,000   20%       18%    10%  
 Next $ 75,000   10%         8%      3%  
 Next $400,000   10%         6%      2%  
 Over $500,000  10%         2%      1% 
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In a case in which the prevailing party recovers no money 
judgment, the prevailing party is entitled to receive 30 percent of 
reasonable actual attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred 
if the case goes to trial, and 20 percent of its actual attorney's fees 
which were necessarily incurred if the case is resolved without 
going to trial.44  Courts are given the authority to vary the legal 
fees awarded under the noted formula if they believe varying the 
fees is warranted after weighing a variety of criteria enumerated in 
the statute.45 Thus, judges are provided significant discretion to 
raise or lower legal fees awarded under the statute to ensure that 
they are equitable on a case by case basis. 
 
2. California: 
 
California provides limited “loser pays” provisions in cases 
involving “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction 
intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or 
services to any consumer are unlawful.”46 Under California law, 
consumers who prevail in an action arising out of an unfair method 
of competition or deceptive business practice are entitled to 
recover both court costs and attorney’s fees.47 Prevailing 
defendants in such actions may also recover court costs and 
reasonable attorney’s fees if a court finds that the plaintiff brought 
the action in bad faith.48 
 California also allows partial attorney’s fees to be awarded 
(capped at $75 per hour with discretion given the trial court to 
raise the amount based on cost of living or limited availability of 
counsel49) in cases brought by or against the state related to the 
determination, collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty 
in any court of record in the state.50 
An offer of judgment provision is also available under 
California law that requires a plaintiff who rejects an offer of 
judgment to pay the defendant’s post-offer court costs and post-
offer attorney’s fees if the offer of judgment is rejected the 
plaintiff subsequently obtains at trial a judgment that is less than 
the defendant’s settlement offer.51 
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3. Florida: 
 
Florida adopted the English Rule for medical malpractice 
cases in 1980 and required the losing party to pay all of the 
prevailing party’s litigation expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
but repealed the fee-shifting provisions five years later with 
inconclusive results.52  
 
Like California and several other states, Florida has an offer 
of settlement provision that requires a plaintiff to pay a portion of 
the defendant’s attorney’s fees if a court determines that a 
settlement offer is rejected unreasonably.53 Under the Florida 
statute, “[a]n offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably 
rejected by a defendant if the judgment entered is at least 25 
percent greater than the offer rejected, and an offer shall be 
presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a plaintiff if the 
judgment entered is at least 25 percent less than the offer 
rejected.”54 Unreasonable rejection of a settlement offer will 
require payment of the court costs, expenses and reasonable 
attorney’s fees incurred by the other party after the settlement offer 
was rejected.55 
 
4. Illinois: 
  
Under its Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices 
Act, Illinois allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees in 
addition to court costs to the prevailing party in civil actions for 
consumer fraud and deceptive business practices.56 
 
5. New York: 
 
As part of its consumer protection laws, New York allows a 
court to assign reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff 
in civil actions involving deceptive business acts and practices.57  
Attorney’s fees may also be awarded by a court to the prevailing 
party, other than the state, for civil action brought against the state, 
unless the court finds that the position of the state was 
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substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award 
unjust.58 
 
6. Oklahoma: 
 
Oklahoma makes the losing party in a wide range of civil 
actions responsible for the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees 
through separate statutory provisions. A sampling of these areas 
include property line disputes;59 livestock liens;60 actions for 
injunctive relief to prevent the unlawful use of a lender’s name, 
trade name or trademark;61 actions to enforce visitation 
agreements;62 actions for labor or services rendered or on certain 
accounts, bills and contracts;63 and actions involving the 
unauthorized use of a deceased personality’s right of publicity64 
among many others.  
 
7. Oregon: 
 
Oregon allows for a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees 
to a prevailing plaintiff in certain small claims in tort where the 
amount in controversy does not exceed $7,500 if a demand for 
payment was made at least 30 days prior to the commencement of 
the action by the plaintiff of the defendant or the defendant’s 
insurance company.65 No attorneys’ fees may be awarded, 
however, if a settlement offer was made by the defendant before 
the action was commenced that is the same or more than the final 
judgment obtained in court.66 Defendants may also be awarded 
reasonable attorneys’ fees for successful counterclaims for 
amounts of $7,500 or less.67 
 
Reasonable attorneys’ fees may also be awarded a prevailing      
plaintiff In any action for damages for breach of an express or 
implied warranty in a sale of consumer goods or services where 
the amount pleaded is $ 2,500 or less if the court finds that written 
demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant 
not less than 30 days before commencement of the action and that 
the defendant was allowed within that 30 days reasonable 
opportunity to inspect any property pertaining to the claim. 
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However, attorneys’ fees are not available if the defendant 
tendered a settlement offer to the plaintiff, prior to the 
commencement of the action of an amount not less than the 
damages awarded to the plaintiff at trial.68 Prevailing defendants 
may also be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees if the action is 
found to have been frivolous.69  
 
Oregon also allows the award of reasonable attorney’s fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs (and prevailing defendants if the action is 
deemed to be frivolous) in cases involving unlawful discrimination 
in both court and administrative proceedings;70 in actions for 
intimidation;71 in actions for trade discrimination;72 and in civil 
actions for involuntary servitude or trafficking in persons.73 
Oregon also provides for the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs in a range of other actions, including: the 
award of liquidated damages to sports official subjected to 
offensive physical contact;74 the sale or successful solicitation of 
sale of securities in violation of Oregon Securities Law;75 injury to 
or removal of produce, trees or shrubs;76 discrimination in renting 
housing because of assistance animal (attorneys’ fees may be 
awarded to the prevailing plaintiff or to the prevailing defendant if 
the plaintiff’s case is determined to be frivolous);77 in actions by 
employees to collect wages not paid within 48 hours (excluding 
weekends) of the time they become due;78 unlawful discrimination 
in employment, public accommodations and real property 
transactions (attorney fees awardable to the prevailing party);79 
actions to recover on insurance policies or contractor’s bond 
unpaid within six months where settlement is not made within six 
months of proof of loss (defendants may recover a reasonable 
amount towards their attorneys’ fees if a settlement offer rejected 
by a plaintiff is the same or larger than the ultimate judgment 
obtained at trial);80 and, among others, unlawful trade practices 
(prevailing defendants may also be awarded attorneys’ fees when a 
court finds the plaintiff’s case to be frivolous).81 
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8. Texas: 
 
Texas imposes an offer of settlement system that can make 
parties who reject an offer liable for a portion of the prevailing 
party’s attorneys’ fees under certain circumstances. The offer of 
settlement under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure82 Rule 167 must 
be invoked by the defendant by filing a declaration invoking the 
rule within 45 days of the case being set for trial.83  Once invoked, 
Rule 167 provides that if an offer is rejected and the judgment 
entered is significantly less favorable than the settlement offer, 
then the prevailing party whose offer was rejected is entitled to be 
reimbursed for the litigation costs incurred after the offer was 
made.84 A judgment award on monetary claims is defined as 
significantly less favorable than an offer to settle those claims if 
the offeree is a claimant and the judgment would be less than 80 
percent of the offer, or if the offeree is a defendant and the 
judgment would be more than 120 percent of the offer.85 Litigation 
costs are defined to include court costs, reasonable fees for not 
more than two testifying expert witnesses, and reasonable attorney 
fees.86 The litigation costs that may be awarded under the rule 
cannot exceed the sum of the noneconomic damages, the 
exemplary or additional damages, and one-half of the economic 
damages to be awarded to the claimant in the judgment minus the 
amount of any statutory or contractual liens in connection with the 
occurrences or incidents giving rise to the claim.87  In addition, the 
rule does not apply to a class action, a shareholder's derivative 
action, an action by or against the State, a unit of state government, 
or a political subdivision of the State, an action brought under the 
Family Code, an action to collect workers' compensation benefits 
under title 5, subtitle A of the Labor Code, or an action filed in a 
justice of the peace court or small claims court.88  
 
V. WHAT IS THE LIKELY IMPACT OF ADOPTING THE 
WORLD RULE OVER THE AMERICAN RULE? 
In sum, the oft cited argument in defense of the American 
Rule is that loser pays systems will have a chilling effect on 
plaintiffs’ willingness to assert their lawful claims in court for fear 
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of having to pay the defendant’s costs if they do not prevail in 
court. 89  This position is combined with the fear that requiring  
payment of the prevailing party’s legal fees can have a chilling 
effect on individuals of limited means asserting valid claims in 
court for fear of losing and having to bear not only their own legal 
expenses, but also those of the winning party.90 Critics of the 
American Rule counter that having to pay for one’s own legal 
expenses can also prevent plaintiffs with limited means from using 
the courts to settle valid claims and provides an advantage to 
litigants with superior resources.91 These critics also note that it 
fails to fully compensate successful plaintiffs for their losses since 
they must unjustly pay their lawyers to receive that to which they 
are legally entitled to.92 
In fact there is little disincentive for individuals under the 
American System to refrain from pursuing cases with little merit in 
the courts for their nuisance value since settling such cases can be 
far less costly for defendants regardless of their merit. Although 
current data on national and regional average hourly rates charged 
by lawyers is hard to come by, one recent survey of 250 national 
firms found the average rate charged by these firms to be $372 per 
hour.93 Legal advice is expensive, and litigation more so. It is 
generally accepted that only 2-3 percent of civil cases in the 
United States proceed to a verdict;94 the rest are settled or 
abandoned before a judgment is entered.95  
Although reliable statistics are not available on the number of 
civil cases settled in the United States every year, most 
commentators often cite settlement figures of 90% or more.96 The 
high cost of litigation no doubt encourages settlement of cases 
under the American Rule, especially those of relatively low value 
as the cost of defending against these in the courts can be high. 
Indeed, it is not unusual for the combined legal bills of litigants to 
equal or exceed the amounts in controversy in litigated cases.97 It 
is understandable, then, that many defendants faced with the 
unsavory choice of settling a low-merit claim or paying a 
significantly higher amount in attorneys’ fees to defend in court 
will often choose expediency over justice and settle a weak claim.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
  
It is not possible to predict with certainty the effect of 
adopting a “loser pays” system in the United States. Replacing the 
American Rule with the World Rule would likely reduce the 
number of claims with questionable merit as plaintiffs faced with 
the prospect of having to pay the defendant’s legal fees should 
they not prevail in court would be less likely to bring such cases in 
the first instance. Likewise, it stands to reason that fewer 
questionable claims would be settled by defendants unburdened by 
having to pay their own legal costs in cases when they are likely to 
prevail in court. But even if this were not the case, there is still a 
compelling reason to abandon the American Rule: Fundamental 
fairness. In bringing legal action, a plaintiff subjects a defendant to 
legal costs and significant inconvenience that a defendant can only 
avoid by capitulating to the plaintiff’s claims. The American Rule 
requires each party, regardless of the merits of their case, to bear 
their own legal expense simply because it is the established 
practice that they should do so. This practice can victimize both 
virtuous plaintiffs and defendants by requiring them to bear the 
cost of prevailing in court while at the same time rewarding 
unreasonable plaintiffs and defendants by allowing them to use the 
cost of litigation as leverage to exact advantageous settlements to 
which they have little legal claim.  
 
Valid concerns about preserving access to justice can be 
addressed within the context of a loser pays system in various 
ways. Both the federal government and states could follow 
Alaska’s lead and adopt a system that awards attorneys’ fees based 
on a sliding scale as a percentage of judgments obtained at trial. 
Exceptions can be carved out awarding attorneys’ fees to 
prevailing parties, such as in matters relating to family law, civil 
rights, or class actions. Courts can also be given the right to refuse 
claims for attorneys’ fees for compelling reasons under their equity 
powers when justice requires it.  
 
While American exceptionalism may justify standing in 
opposition to the rest of the world when there is just cause, the 
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American Rule seems to offer little more by way of compelling 
justification in the final analysis than a custom and tradition whose 
only clear beneficiaries are the lawyers who thrive in a country 
with the dubious distinction of being universally acknowledged as 
the most litigious nation on earth. 
 
 
                                                             
1 See generally Marc Galanter, “The Day After the Litigation Explosion,” 46 
Md. L. Rev. 3 (Fall, 1986); Deborah L. Rhode, “Frivolous Litigation and Civil 
Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution,” 54 Duke 
L.J. 447 (November, 2004). 
2 J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, “Comparative Litigation Rates,” 
Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion 
Paper No. 681, 5 (November 2011). Available online at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseye
r_681.pdf (Last accessed March 11, 2012). 
3 Charles N. W. Keckle, “Lawyered UP: A Book Review Essay,” 27 T.M. 
Cooley L. Rev. 57, 74 (Hilary Term, 2010). 
4 Id. 
5 Towers Watson, 2010 Update on U.S. Tort Cost Trends, at 3 (available 
online at http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/3424/Towers-
Watson-Tort-Report-1.pdf (last accessed January 29, 2012). 
6 Towers Perrin Tillinghast, U.S. Tort Costs and Cross-Border Perspectives: 
2005 Update at 6 (2005) available at 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/2005_Tor
t_Cost/2005_Tort.pdf (Last accessed March 11, 2012). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 4. 
9 Id. at 6. 
10 See generally John F. Vargo, “The American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice,” 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 1567 
(Summer, 1993) for a discussion of the genesis of the American Rule and 
English Rule (arguing in favor of the American Rule). 
11 Id. at 1598 
12 See James R. Maxeiner, Section II.C: Civil Procedure: Cost and Fee 
Allocation in Civil Procedure, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 195, 197 (2010) (noting that 
court costs are generally payable by the losing party in federal courts, but 
not expert witness fees or attorneys’ fees absent statutes directing awards 
and a few judge-made exceptions). 
13 Id. at 196. 
14 Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys’ Fees 
in Civil Litigation, 12 Fl. Coastal Law Rev. 357, 365-66 (Winter, 2011) 
17 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
(quoting Jennifer M. Smith, Credit Card, Attorney’s Fees, and the Putative 
Debtor: A Pyrrhic Victory? Putative Debtors May Win the Battle But 
Nevertheless Lose the War, 61 ME. Law Rev. 171, 187).  
15 See, e.g., John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The 
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 1567 (Summer 1993). 
16 Id. at 1574 
17 Id. 
18 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much law, Too Little Justice: Too 
much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 989, 1005 (1998). 
19 Maxeiner, supra note 12 at 218 
20 See generally Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a "Loser Pay” Rule 
on the American Legal System: an Economic Analysis and Proposal for 
Reform, 8 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 567 (Spring 2011). 
21 Id. at 569. 
22 Lubna Takruri, $54 million 'pant suit' runs cleaners out of business, The 
Associated Press, Washington, September 20, 2007, at A2. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Maxeiner, supra note 12 at 198 (referencing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) and 
Fed. R. App. P. 39). 
26 Id. 
27 Jeff Holth, I Win, You Pay: Considerations of Efficiency and Fairness in 
Minnesota Appellate Litigation of Attorney’s Fees, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
267, 270 (2010).  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Daniel Glimcher, LEGAL DENTISTRY: HOW ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
CERTAIN PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS CAN GIVE RULE 68 THE 
NECESSARY TEETH TO EFFECTUATE ITS PURPOSES, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1449 , 1453 (2006).  
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1471-1474. 
34 Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) 
35 Generally individuals whose net worth do not exceed $ 2,000,000 and 
any owner of an unincorporated business, partnership, corporation, 
association, unit of local government, or organization, whose net worth 
does not exceed $ 7,000,000 and which had no more than 500 employees at 
the time the adversary adjudication was initiated (5 U.S.C. § 504 (b) (1) (B) 
for administrative actions and (28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (2) (B) for court 
actions)      
36 "Fees and other expenses" include the reasonable expenses of expert 
witnesses, studies, analyses, engineering reports, tests, and projects found 
2014 / Leading the World / 18 
 
                                                                                                                                        
by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and 
reasonable attorney fees.  The amount of fees awarded are based upon 
prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, 
except that no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess of 
the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United 
States and attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $ 125 per hour 
unless the court determines that special circumstances justify a higher fee. 
initiated (5 U.S.C. § 504 (b) (1) (A) for administrative actions and (28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412 (d) (2) (A) for court actions) 
37 See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980), reprinted in 
1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin News 4984 
38 5 U.S.C. § 504 (a) (1) 
39 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (1) (A) 
40 5 U.S.C. § 504 (a) (1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (1) (A), respectively 
   
41 Alaska Stat. § 09.60.010(a) (2012) 
42 See Alaska Stat. § 09.60.010(c)-(e) (2012) 
43 See Alaska Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 82 (a)-(b) available at 
http://courts.alaska.gov/civ2.htm#79 (Last accessed February 24, 2012). 
44 Alaska Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 82 (b)(2). available at 
http://courts.alaska.gov/civ2.htm#79 (Last accessed February 24, 2012). 
45 Alaska Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 82 (b)(3)(A)-(K). available at 
http://courts.alaska.gov/civ2.htm#79 (Last accessed February 24, 2012). 
The specific enumerated criteria in this subparagraph that judges may 
weigh in assessing legal fees different from those provided for in the 
stature include the following: (A)the complexity of the litigation; (B) the 
length of trial; (C) the reasonableness of the attorneys' hourly rates and the 
number of hours expended; (D) the reasonableness of the number of 
attorneys used; (E) the attorneys' efforts to minimize fees; (F) the 
reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued by each side; (G) 
vexatious or bad faith conduct; (H) the relationship between the amount of 
work performed and the significance of the matters at stake; (I) the extent 
to which a given fee award may be so onerous to the non-prevailing party 
that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of the 
courts; (J) the extent to which the fees incurred by the prevailing party 
suggest that they had been influenced by considerations apart from the 
case at bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by others against the 
prevailing party or its insurer; and (K) other equitable factors deemed 
relevant. If the court varies an award, the court shall explain the reasons for 
the variation.)  
46 See Cal Civ Code § 1770(a)(1)-(22) (2012) for a listing of unfair business 
competition and unfair or deceptive business practices. 
47 Cal Civ Code § 1780(e) (2012). 
19 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
48 Id. 
49 Cal Rev & Tax Code § 7156(C)(iii) (2012) 
50 Cal Rev & Tax Code § 7156(a) (2012). 
51 Cal Code Civ Proc § 998(c)(1) (2012). 
52 See generally Christopher R. McLennan, “The Price of Justice: Allocating 
Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation,” 12 Fl. Coastal L. Rev. 357 at 382. 
53 Fla. Stat. § 45.061(2) (2012). 
54 Id. 
55 Fla. Stat. § 45.061(3)(a) (2012). 
56 815 ILCS 505/10a (b)(2012). 
57 NY CLS Gen Bus § 349(h) (2012). 
58 NY CLS CPLR § 8601(a) (2011). See also NY CLS CPLR § 8602(b) (2011). 
59 4 Okl. St. § 150.1 (2012). 
60 4 Okl. St. § 201.10 (2012). 
61 6 Okl. St. § 1418 (2012). 
62 10 Okl. St. § 7505-1.5 (2012). 
63 12 Okl. St. § 936 (2012). 
64 12 Okl. St. § 1448 (2012). 
65 ORS § 20.080(1) (2010). 
66 Id. 
67 ORS § 20.080(2) (2010). 
68 ORS § 20.098(1) (2010). 
69 ORS § 20.098(2) (2010). 
70 ORS § 20.107(1) (2010). 
71 ORS § 30.198(3) (2009). 
72 ORS § 30.860 (2009). 
73 ORS § 30.867 (2009). 
74 ORS § 30.882 (2009). 
75 ORS § 59.115 (2009). 
76 ORS § 105.810 (2009). 
77 ORS § 346.690 (2009). 
78 ORS § 652.200 (2009). 
79 ORS § 659A.885 (2009). 
80 ORS § 742.061 (2009). 
81 ORS § 646.638 (2009). 
82 Available online at 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/trcp/rcp_all.pdf (Last 
accessed March 4, 2012). 
83 Tex. R. Civ. P. 167.2(a) (2012). 
84 Tex. R. Civ. P. 167.4(a) (2012). 
85 Tex. R. Civ. P. 167.4(b) (2012). 
86 Tex. R. Civ. P. 167.4(c) (2012). 
87 Tex. R. Civ. P. 167.4(d) (2012). 
2014 / Leading the World / 20 
 
                                                                                                                                        
88 Tex. R. Civ. P. 167.1(a)-(f) (2012). 
89 See generally John F. Vargo, “The American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice,” 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 1567 
(Summer 1993);  
90 Christopher R. McLennan, “The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys’ Fees 
in Civil Litigation,” 12 Fl. Coastal L. Rev. 357, 367-367 (Winter 2011). 
91 Id. at 368. 
92 Id. 
93 2009 Law Firm Billing Survey, The National Law Journal, December 7, 
2009 available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202436068099&slret
urn=1&hbxlogin=1 (Last accessed March 18, 2012). 
94 John Barkai, Elizabeth Kent, and Pamela Martin, “Settling Civil Lawsuits 
in the Hawaii Circuit Courts,” 10 Hawaii B.J. 1 (2007). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Maxeiner, supra note 12 at 200. 
